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LEGISLATIVE SUGGESTIONS

But suppose that the title is not a full equitable title, but
that only ninety-five per cent of the payments on a land contract
have been paid at the time of the death of the grantee, or seventyfive per cent thereof, or fifty per cent thereof. The equitable title
is present but even under the extremely liberal doctrine of our
court which it admits is "probably out of harmony with some
decisions elsewhere under statutes similar to ours," can it be
said that the grantee had a legal estate which would entitle the
widow to dower? The practice of purchasing valuable property
on land contract is increasing and large tracts of land are now
held in that way upon which substantial payments are made.
It is obvious that an easy way exists to defeat the right of dower
through such contracts and by means of other equitable estates.
The statute granting dower should be amended to grant dower in
all equitable estates in real property. Perhaps the aid of the
various organizations of women in this state should be enlisted to
secure this change, but in any event the legislation is needed to
supplement and complete the conclusions of the learned article
on the rights of women in Wisconsin by Chief Justice Winslow,
which appears in this issue.
It has not been the purpose of this article to discuss the
merits of the cases to which attention has been directed, for the
law is settled on these points. The situation created by these
decisions should be remedied at the coming meeting of the legislature of this state.

AMENDMENT OF SECTION 2863.
JAmES

D.

MORAN, '17.

To the Legislature of the State of Wisconsin, we respectfully
submit
A BILL
to amend Section 2863, of the Statutes relating to trial courts
decision on facts.
The people of the State of Wisconsin represented in Senate
and Assembly do enact as follows :--Section 2863 of the Statutes
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is amended to read,-Section 2863.-Upon a trial of a question
of fact by the court, its decision shall be given in writing and
filed with the clerk within twenty days after the court at which
the trial took place. Judgment upon the decision shall be entered
accordingly, as of the term at which the cause was tried, and the
judge shall state in his decision separately;
i.

The facts found by him; and

2.

His conclusions of law thereon.

3. No judge shall sign findings prepared by counsel, but
this shall not be construed to prevent Counsel from filing proposed findings and conclusions of law, and the judge shall have
the power to permit or order an argument of Counsel in open
Court upon proposed findings and conclusions in order to assist
in drafting the proper ones. The judge may also submit tentative
findings and conclusions and order an argument on them in order
to assist him in drafting the final ones.
The present statute concise and plain as words could make it
would from a layman's viewpoint seem easily enforceable but the
legal interpretation given it has made it one of the stumbling
blocks of the profession.
The judiciary and the practicing attorneys are jointly to
blame for the condition in which we find this statute. The judiciary under the impression that this section infringed upon
their constitutional power of review, early indicated that it was
to be construed as directory rather than obligatory.'
By so
doing it opened the door to much abuse as to time, manner and
sufficiency of findings. The lawyers are at fault for allowing
the practice to develop to the extent of their drawing their own
findings and merely presenting them to the judge for his signature. Nobody would think of allowing a boxer to referee the
contest in which he was a contestant but the practice in law at
present appears to be different. There, the winner of the preliminary contest is given every possible chance to attain victory
in the decisive battle and the result is an abuse which is becoming
unbearable.
'Sayre v. Langton, 7 Wis. 214.
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To remedy this evil, the Law Review takes this means of
suggesting the foregoing amendment. In framing the same we
have taken into consideration the present condition of the practice
by making it discretionary with the trial judge to draw his own
findings or to allow them to be drawn by one of the attorneys.
If the latter method is pursued, a hearing must be had at which
all parties are afforded an opportunity to voice their objections
prior to judge's signing or in lieu of such procedure, a stipulation
that the findings so drawn are satisfactory is sufficient.
The attention of the legislators, for whom this article is
primarily intended and who might consider this suggestion a
mere theoretical whim of the Law Review, is respectfully directed
to the recent utterances of almost every Wisconsin Supreme
Court Justice now on the bench, bearing upon this particular
question.
Judge Marshall in Neacy vs. Board of Supervisors, I44 Wis.
states that "there is no statute respecting the practice, strict
compliance with which would be more conducive to good, speedy
and certain administration of justice, yet no statute so frequently
violated in letter or spirit, or both. The most frequent violations
are by general findings not responsive at all to the command of
the law that the judge shall state separately the facts found by
him. That species of findings has been said not to arise to the
dignity of an attempt to comply with the statute and to not be
entitled to consideration within the rule that findings of fact
will not be disturbed on appeal unless against the clear preponderance of the evidence. The abuse in that field has been so
persistent notwithstanding frequent suggestions that the making
of such findings constitute error which should not be indulged in
merely because the rule applicable to the generality of cases that
it may be deemed fatally harmful, that it has seemed necessary
to indicate-Damman vs. Damman post-that such abuse may
be fatal to the result."
210,

EFFECT OR WEIGHT GIVEN FINDINGS.
Findings of fact by the trial court will not be disturbed
unless contrary to a clear preponderance of the evidence.!
'Daubner v. McFarlmn, 136 Wis. 515.

In re Kringel's estate, 156 Wis. 94.
35
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In a recent case there arose a conflict as to whether the
transaction amounted to a gift or a bailment, and evidence was
admitted supporting both views. The trial court found against
such gift and the Supreme Court in affirming the trial court's
decision adhered to the rule that where there is competent evidence sufficient to support a finding, that court will presume, in
the absence of an affirmative showing to the contrary, that the
finding rests upon the competent evidence solely.3
NECESSITY FOR AND RESULTS OF FAILURE TO FILE
SPECIFIC FINDINGS.
In the case of Damman vs. Damman, 144 Wis. 122, the trial
court failed to make such findings as are required by Section 2863.
Judge Barnes, in commenting thereon, states that such failure
constitutes error but does not necessarily lead to reversal. But
"in case of such general findings the court is left in a predicament where it may pursue one of three courses (i) to affirm
the judgment if clearly supported by a preponderance of the evidence, (2) to reverse if not so supported ordering judgment in
accordance with what appears to this court to be the preponderance; or (3) if that course seems to present peril of injustice to
remand for further trial and findings. If this court undertakes
to determine which way the evidence preponderates, it must take
the evidence as it finds it in the printed record and very often
this cannot be done with safety." Case reversed and cause
remanded with directions to trial court to take further evidence
in the case and to make findings of fact and conclusions of law
upon the evidence before it in accordance with the requirements
of Section 2863.
Where, in an action for breach of contract the court found
for plaintiff, it was held error for the trial court to fail to file a
finding on an issue of accord and satisfaction, and it appeared
that the preponderance of the evidence on such issue was clearly
in favor of the defendant, the Supreme Court on reversal,
directed judgment dismissing the complaint instead of ordering a
new trial.4
'Hilton v. Rahr, I55 Wis. ii6.
'Kelin v. Woodbury, 150 Wig. 499.
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OPINIONS BY CIRCUIT JUDGES-FINDINGS
BY ATTORNEYS.
In a recent case' there was a lengthy opinion submitted
by the trial court covering all evidence and issues on the trial
and embodying his conclusions of law thereon. The opinion
ended with the instruction "findings and judgment may be drawn
in accordance with the foregoing conclusions." One of the plaintiff's attorneys then drew the so-called findings, using ten (io)
printed papers for same in accordance with the direction in the
opinion. Chief Justice Winslow reprimanded the trial court for
this mode of procedure and wrote a lengthy criticism thereon
because as he states "a number of cases have been presented to
us recently where the findings have consisted of many pages of
mere evidentiary facts, sometimes leaving grave doubt as to what
ultimate facts the court really determined thus entailing upon
us much tedious and unnecessary labor." He further requests
the trial judges, whether they personally draw the findings or
not, to see to it in every case that said findings be confined to
the ultimate facts as defined in his opinion.
A previous judicial condemnation of this procedure was
administered by Judge Marshall in Neacy vs. Board of Supervisors, supra. In this case the findings were composed of some
over 5,000 words and was the work of one of the attorneys. He
points out to the circuit judges how a strict compliance with the
statutory requirements will lessen, rather than increase the labor
performed by many overworked circuit judges, and how much
expense, delay and uncertainty in the administration of justice
may be saved. In the same case the trial court wrote an opinion
which the law does not require expending in preparation thereof
several times the work needed to draw findings which the law
does require and then was compelled to study somewhat partisan
findings drafted by judicial request, composed of thousands of
words, devoting work thereto, in order to intelligently sign them,
largely in excess of that needed to draft concise findings, composed of the few hundred needed words.

'Cointe v. Congregation of St. John the Baptist, I4 Wis. 405.
37
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UNCERTAINTY AND ABSURDITY OF PARTISAN
FINDINGS.
The most recent and striking example of this practice is
shown in the case of In re Lynchs Will.' The only issue was
that of undue influence and probate was refused on that ground.
The trial closed on June 2 9 th, 1915, and on October 28th, 1915

(a period of four months), forty-one findings of fact were filed
including a finding that the testatrix had not the mental capacity
to execute a will. There was no evidence to sustain such a finding, on the contrary, all the evidence shows the testatrix was of
sound mind. Judge Vinje in his opinion states "a finding covering that issue * * * undue influence * * * is all that the statute

and good practice requires. Instead of that, we have forty-one
findings consisting in the main of a synopsis of the evidence
favorable to the contestant. Such practice deserves condemnation. The situation would lend color to the surmise that the
findings were drawn by contestant's attorneys and not closely
enough scanned by the judge at time of signing for we cannot
believe that he intended to find lack of testamentary capacity, yet
the assertion of that fact is included in both the findings of fact
and conclusions of law. "
In order to further impress upon you gentlemen the urgent
necessity for the remedial measure we are soliciting, we respectfully direct your attention to the following summary of the points
brought out in the foregoing, to-wit:(i) Findings of fact will not be disturbed unless contrary
to a clear preponderance of the evidence. Note that the rule
would be unchanged even though the findings were drawn by the
successful attorney.
The present system is working much delay, expense
(2)
and uncertainty in the administration of justice.
The change we advocate will tend to lessen rather than
(3)
increase the labor of the circuit court judges.
(4) The Justices of the Supreme Court, individually and
collectively, demand a change in the procedure.
(5)

JUSTICE demands the change.

6 166 Wis. 466.

